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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-1463 
______________ 
 
SHELLY SALAK NEWELL, 
    Appellant 
   
v. 
 
HERITAGE SENIOR LIVING, LLC; 
WESTRUM HANOVER, LP, trading as TRADITIONS OF HANOVER 
  
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-12-cv-06094) 
District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 20, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed: December 20, 2016) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Shelly Salak Newell appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on her retaliation claim under the Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (“FHA”).  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.  
I 
 Defendant Westrum Hanover, LP, t/a Traditions of Hanover (“Traditions”), is an 
independent living community for seniors that rents apartments and provides certain 
services to its residents.  Defendant Heritage Senior Living, LLC provides management 
services to Traditions.  In October 2010, Newell began working at Traditions as a 
marketing manager and reported directly to the marketing director, Jennifer Murphy.  
Newell’s job description included “assisting [Murphy] in representing the residence in a 
positive light, maintaining favorable relationships with hospitals, local physicians, and 
other marketing and referral sources.”  Supp. App. 205.   
 During the first six months of her employment, Newell received generally positive 
feedback on her performance, but she struggled with using Traditions’ computerized 
sales system and with getting potential residents to visit the community.  In April 2011, 
Newell requested Murphy’s permission to run for election to the board of Lehigh Valley 
Aging in Place (“LVAIP”), a local organization in Traditions’ industry.  Murphy denied 
this request, citing concerns about Newell’s performance.  Around this time, Newell 
developed a tense working relationship with Murphy and reportedly made critical 
statements about Murphy at an LVAIP event.  Despite the poor working relationship 
between Newell and Murphy, Newell received a very positive annual performance 
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evaluation from Murphy in October 2011, but Murphy noted that Newell “can be very 
opinionated and needs to be willing to consider other points of view.”  Supp. App. 214.   
  Shortly after Newell started working at Traditions, Newell raised concerns that 
Traditions’ process for evaluating the “appropriateness” of potential residents violated the 
FHA.  Supp. App. 171.  She thereafter made specific complaints.  In January 2012, 
Newell told Murphy that Traditions violated the FHA by discriminating against a 
prospective resident couple because the husband used a wheelchair.  Newell also 
expressed concern about certain draft documents circulating in late February 2012 setting 
forth guidelines to determine whether a prospective resident was a proper fit for 
Traditions.  One such document contained language indicating that, to be successful in 
the independent living environment of Traditions, the ideal residents “require minimal or 
no assistance, medical or otherwise,” are independently mobile, capable of feeding and 
dressing themselves, independent regarding personal hygiene, and responsible for 
managing their own medications.  Supp. App. 228.  Another document stated that “[w]e 
are looking for new residents with a high acuity level” and that the residents needed to be 
able to take their own medications, get to and from the dining room on their own, transfer 
in and out of a dining room chair by themselves, and manage any incontinence issues.  
Supp. App. 247.  Newell wrote to Murphy and Diane Nowakowski, Traditions’ Executive 
Director, that these policies were “too subjective and restrictive” and required residents to 
be “strictly independent,” Supp. App. 228, even though Traditions had current residents 
who required support, and that it therefore appeared that Traditions had different criteria 
for new residents.  Although Newell’s written comments did not explicitly reference the 
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FHA, Newell testified that, in the days that followed the circulation of these documents, 
she specifically told Murphy that the proposed admission guidelines violated the FHA.     
 By late February 2012, Newell’s relationship with Murphy had deteriorated, and 
Murphy told Newell that she needed to maintain a more positive attitude, show Murphy 
respect, and take direction from Murphy without pushback.  Their working relationship 
did not improve, and Murphy and Nowakowski met with Newell in late March 2012 to 
discuss her performance.  During the meeting, Murphy and Nowakowski told Newell that 
she needed to improve her attitude, stop commiserating with the staff and residents, and 
communicate in a respectful manner with Murphy.  Newell was then placed on a 30-day 
project or “action plan” under Murphy’s direct supervision.  Supp. App. 273.   
 Around the same time, Newell anonymously contacted the Fair Housing Council 
of Suburban Philadelphia and spoke to Megan Bolin.  Newell told Bolin that she worked 
at an independent living community that was refusing to accept new residents in 
wheelchairs or scooters and had a policy of discouraging disabled people from joining the 
community.  Bolin informed Newell that the practices she described likely violated the 
FHA.    
 After Newell’s phone call with Bolin, Murphy asked Newell to enter “loss 
leads”—explanations regarding why a lead on a potential resident was not pursued—into 
Traditions’ computer system, including identifying when a potential resident was deemed 
inappropriate due to hygiene or mobility issues.  Newell informed Murphy that entering 
this information violated the FHA, and she refused to comply.  Murphy dismissed this 
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exchange as a typical instance of Newell pushing back on her requests and did not inquire 
as to why Newell felt that entering the loss leads would violate the FHA.    
 In April 2012, Murphy received a call from a realtor who worked with Traditions’ 
residents to sell their homes.  The realtor told Murphy that she had spoken with Newell 
about a particular couple’s house that was about to go on the market, and Newell had 
indicated that she felt the price was too low.  The realtor also told Murphy that Newell’s 
husband, an electrician, had given the couple a quote regarding electrical work to their 
home.  After hearing this story, Murphy told Nowakowski and David Lovitz, the majority 
partner of Heritage Senior Living, that she felt the situation presented a conflict of 
interest.  Lovitz met with Newell and explained to her that her husband’s financial 
involvement with residents was inappropriate, but he found that Newell was “defiant” in 
response.  Supp. App. 99.   Ultimately, however, Newell’s husband did not provide a bid 
or do work for the residents.  
In early May 2012, Newell had conversations with Nowakowski regarding the 
FHA.  Nowakowski asked Newell where she obtained her information regarding the 
FHA, and Newell explained that she learned about the FHA from communications with 
the Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia in connection with her previous job.  
Nowakowski asked for contact information for the Fair Housing Council, and, on May 8, 
2012, Newell emailed Bolin’s contact information to Nowakowski.     
 The same day, Newell called Bolin and identified herself and her employer.  
Newell indicated that she told Traditions personnel that its policies violated the FHA.  
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Newell told Bolin she believed Traditions was retaliating against her for opposing its 
allegedly unlawful conduct.     
 Around the same time, Newell once again asked Murphy’s permission to become 
a member of the LVAIP board and Murphy agreed.  On May 8, 2012, the LVAIP sent out 
a newsletter to all members of the organization that included statements from the 
nominees for the board.  Newell’s statement indicated that she wanted to become a board 
member because “[i]t will be challenging in many ways,” and then said that the “[m]ost 
challenging part will be trying to convince my employer that this will be time well spent 
and more so, great exposure for them.”  App. 391.  Murphy received the newsletter, 
forwarded it to Nowakowski, and indicated that she found Newell’s statement to be 
“disrespectful” and “negative PR.”  Supp. App. 320.  Nowakowski then sent an email to 
Lovitz that included Newell’s statement.  Lovitz responded that it was a “perfect example 
of the problem,” which appears to be a reference to Newell’s attitude issues, and that he 
was considering terminating her.  Supp. App. 324.   
 On May 14, 2012, Nowakowski and Murphy met with Newell and informed her 
that her statement on her LVAIP application cast Traditions in a negative light by 
implying that Traditions did not value involvement in LVAIP.  They further referenced 
the conflict of interest issue with Newell’s husband and the LVAIP event where Newell 
had openly criticized Murphy.  Newell was then sent home.  That evening, Newell 
contacted Bolin and asked for direction on filing a discrimination claim.  The following 
day, Newell was fired.  
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 In October 2012, Newell filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Defendants retaliated against her in 
violation of the FHA.  The District Court ultimately granted summary judgment in 
Defendants’ favor, concluding that Newell failed to produce sufficient evidence of a 
causal link between her termination and protected activity and, even assuming a causal 
link existed, had failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons for terminating her were pretextual.  Newell appeals.  
II1 
A 
 The FHA makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any 
person . . . on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise 
or enjoyment of” rights under the FHA.  42 U.S.C. § 3617.  We examine Newell’s FHA 
retaliation claim under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343(a)(4).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same standard as the 
District Court, viewing facts and making all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s 
favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
“An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable 
jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might 
affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 
418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986)).  The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-
moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 
respect to which she has the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
323 (1986). 
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Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 
1128 (9th Cir. 2001).  Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation by showing that “(1) the employee engaged in a protected employee 
activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous 
with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the 
employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.”  Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  Once the prima 
facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.  Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).  “The employer satisfies its 
burden of production by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the 
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment 
decision.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Once the employer satisfies this “relatively light” 
burden, “the burden of production rebounds to the plaintiff, who must now show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.”  Id.  “[T]o 
avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff’s evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered 
legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the employer’s 
proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did 
not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is a pretext).”  
Id. at 764 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  The plaintiff may discredit the 
employer’s proffered reasons by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate 
9 
 
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of 
credence,’” and thereby allow a factfinder to conclude that the employer did not act for 
the proffered reasons.  Id. at 765 (citations and emphasis omitted).   
B 
 We will assume for the sake of argument that Newell has established a prima facie 
case of retaliation.  Accordingly, the burden of production shifts to Defendants to come 
forward with non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action.  Here, 
Defendants provided three legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to justify Newell’s 
termination: (1) Newell’s LVAIP board application cast Traditions in a negative light, in 
violation of Newell’s core job function to represent Traditions in a positive light; (2) 
Newell created a conflict of interest by involving herself and her husband’s electrical 
business in a resident’s sale of property; and (3) Newell displayed a poor attitude and a 
chronic pattern of insubordination and disrespect for her superiors.  These reasons, taken 
as true, satisfy Defendants’ burden of production.  Therefore, the burden returns to 
Newell, and we will now consider whether Newell has come forth with sufficient 
evidence to show that all of these reasons were pretextual.  
 Newell argues that her comment about Traditions on her LVAIP board application 
is an implausible basis for her termination because: (1) she received permission to submit 
an application for the LVAIP board; (2) her statement in her application was true because 
Murphy lacked enthusiasm about LVAIP; and (3) another employee cast Traditions in a 
negative light by telling a prospective resident that she could not live at Traditions 
because she used a wheelchair, yet she did not face discipline.  Appellant’s Br. 45-46.  
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First, the fact that Newell received permission to file an application for the LVAIP board 
is irrelevant because it does not indicate that Defendants would have approved of the 
statement Newell made on her application.  Second, it is irrelevant whether the negative 
statement in Newell’s application was a true statement about Murphy’s attitude toward 
LVAIP.  Defendants took issue with Newell’s statement not because it was false but 
because the statement indicated that Defendants did not believe LVAIP was a valuable 
organization.  Even assuming Defendants did not value LVAIP, Defendants reasonably 
would not want this view shared with other professionals in their industry.  Third, the 
comparison to her coworker’s statement is unpersuasive.  While the statement is 
troubling, it was made privately to a potential resident, whereas Newell’s statement was 
viewed by the entire membership of LVAIP and publicly embarrassed Defendants.  
Therefore, there is no inconsistency between Defendants’ treatment of Newell and her 
colleague.   
 Because Newell must establish that each of the employer’s proffered reasons was 
pretextual, Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764, and Newell has not established that Traditions’ 
decision to terminate her based on the statements in her LVAIP application was 
pretextual, Newell has failed to carry her burden.  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly held that Newell failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that all of 
Defendants’ proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were 
pretextual.2 
                                              
2 Fuentes suggests that a plaintiff may be absolved from discrediting each 
legitimate reason if the employer proffers “a bagful of legitimate reasons” and the 
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 Moreover, the record here does not reflect the type of temporal connection 
between her comments about FHA compliance and her termination sufficient to infer that 
the employer’s proffered legitimate reason for termination was pretextual.  See, e.g., 
Farrell, 206 F.3d at 279-81, 286 (noting that temporal proximity can provide a basis to 
infer a causal link between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory act, and 
explaining that the evidence applicable to the causation question is often probative at the 
pretext stage).  Newell started working for Traditions in October 2010, and she testified 
that she began mentioning potential FHA violations “very shortly after [she] started.”  
Supp. App. 171.  Newell was not placed on the 30-day action plan until March 2012 and 
was not fired until May 2012, more than a year after she began raising her FHA concerns.  
While the record shows that Newell raised her FHA concerns many times, including 
providing Nowakowski with information about the Fair Housing Council just days before 
she was terminated, the intervening disclosure of her statements about Traditions on her 
LVAIP board application interrupts any temporal causal link between her FHA advocacy 
and her termination.  For this additional reason, Newell has not shown the reason for her 
termination was pretextual.3   
III 
                                                                                                                                                  
plaintiff casts doubt on “a fair number of them.”  32 F.3d at 764 n.7.  Here, however, 
Traditions provided only three reasons for Newell’s termination, one of which we have 
explained no reasonable jury could conclude was pretext.  The other two reasons, namely 
Newell’s alleged poor attitude and insubordination and the conflict of interest issue, were 
discussed directly with her as issues arose during her employment.  Thus, this case does 
not involve the type of “bagful” of post-hoc rationalizations imagined in Fuentes.   
3 Although the evidence does not establish that Newell was terminated due to her 
FHA advocacy, the concerns she raised about Defendants’ alleged practices are, to say 
the least, troubling.   
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment for Defendants.  
